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Strangers: Determination of Parentage and Artificial
Insemination by Donor Under Ohio Law
SUSAN GARNER EISENMAN*
A modified form of the Uniform Parentage Act (UPA), proposed by the National
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform Laws in 1973, was recently enacted by the
Ohio Legislature.' This act constituted a major departure from prior Ohio law, which
conditioned the establishment of full filial rights upon the child's legitimacy. 2 Legi-
timacy was generally established by the marriage of the parents or a legitimation
action commenced by the father. 3 Under the Ohio Modified Uniform Parentage Act
(OPA) the family unit consists of a child and its biological parents. Full parental-filial
rights and privileges are accorded to all persons who can establish this biological
relationship.4 Any member of the unit or the representative of a member may bring an
action to establish the existence of the biological relationship.5
The OPA, as introduced and enacted, does not include the provision of the UPA
relative to artificial insemination of a married woman with the sperm of a man other
than her husband,6 hereinafter referred to as AID. This omission has resulted in
considerable consternation because, if applied to AID situations, the general pro-
visions of the OPA result in a determination of parentage that directly conflicts with
the intent of the participants. Legislation currently pending would correct the omis-
sion of the AID provision.7
This Article will analyze the OPA and describe the legal consequences of omit-
ting the AID provision as well as the proposed remedial legislation, House Bill 147.
This Article will also discuss the conflicting interests of AID parents and children that
must be considered in legislation such as House Bill 147, which regulates AID.
Finally, this Article will examine additional legal issues concerning the regulation of
other aspects of AID and the use of AID to impregnate surrogate mothers and single
women.
* Attorney at Law, Columbus, Ohio. B.A., 1971; J.D., 1973, Ohio State University.
I. Amended Substitute House Bill 245, 114th Ohio Gen. Assembly, Reg. Sess., enacted on March 3, became
effective on June 29, 1982.
2. Children born out of wedlock could not inherit from or through their father even if their paternity had been
established in a paternity proceeding. Lewis v. Eutsler, 4 Ohio St. 355,360 (1854); Dirion v. Brewer, 20 Ohio App. 298,
299, 151 N.E. 818, 818 (1925).
3. A child born during its parents' marriage was presumed legitimate. Gray v. Richardson, 474 F.2d 1370, 1372
(6th Cir. 1973). A child born out of wedlock could become legitimate (1) if its father married its mother and acknowl-
edged the child; (2) if the father brought a legitimation action in probate court; or (3) if its father adopted it. OIto REV.
CODE ANN. § 2105.18 (Page 1976 & Supp. 1982); § 3107.15 (Page 1980). For further discussion, see In re Byrd, 66 Ohio
St. 2d 334, 336-37, 421 N.E.2d 1284, 1286 (1981); In re Robinette, 3 Ohio Op. 3d 355 (C.P. Cuyahoga County 1976);
Frankart, The Determination of Parentage Under the New Ohio Parentage Act, 55 OHIO ST. B.A. REP. 1248, 1248-49
(1982).
4. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3111.01-.02 (Page Supp. 1983).
5. Id. § 3111.04.
6. UNIF. PARENTAGE AcT § 5 (1973).
7. H.B. 147, 115th Ohio Gen. Assembly, Reg. Sess. (1983) [hereinafter cited as H.B. 1471.
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I. THE OHIO MODIFIED UNIFORM PARENTAGE Acr
Ohio's modified version of the UPA is designed to establish the biological
parentage of a child. The OPA predicates the rights, privileges, and obligations of the
parent-child relationship solely on the biological parental relationship. 8 The common
law and prior statutory law classifications of "legitimate" and "illegitimate" are
eliminated, and, with them, the distinctions in the rights of these two groups of
children. 9 The parental-filial relationship of mother and child is generally established
by proof that a woman gave birth to the child.' 0 The act creates a rebuttable presump-
tion that the parental-filial relationship exists between father and child if there was an
attempted or actual marital relationship between the man and the mother, or an
acknowledgement of paternity by the man, or a court order ordering the man to pay
support for the child. "
A court action for conclusive determination of parentage may be brought by, or
on behalf of, any alleged or presumed parent or by, or on behalf of, the child. 12 Upon
the timely request of any party to the action, genetic testing may be ordered.
13
Genetic tests establish the presence or absence of factors known to be genetically
transmitted, including blood groups antigens, red blood cell antigens, human lym-
phocyte antigens, serum enzymes, and serum proteins. 14 If all of the medical experts
interpret the tests to exclude an alleged or presumed parent as the biological parent,
8. Omio REv. CODE ANN. § 3111.01(B) (Page Supp. 1983).
9. See supra notes 2-3 and accompanying text; see Wallach & Tenoso, The Vindication of the Rights of Unmarried
Mothers and Their Children: An Analysis of the Institution of Illegitimacy, Equal Protection, and the Uniform Parentage
Act, 23 U. KAN. L. REv. 23, 26 (1974).
10. Otno REv. CODE ANN. § 3111.02, .17 (Page Supp. 1983).
I1. Id. Section 3111.03 states in pertinent part:
(A) A man is presumed to be the natural father of a child under any of the following circumstances:
(1) The man and the child's mother are or have been married to each other, and the child is born during the
marriage or is born within three hundred days after the marriage is terminated by death, annulment, divorce, or
dissolution or after the man and the child's mother separate pursuant to a separation agreement.
(2) The man and the child's mother attempted, before the child's birth, to marry each other by a marriage
that was solemnized in apparent compliance with the law of the state in which the marriage took place, the
marriage is or could be declared invalid, and either of the following apply:
(a) The marriage can only be declared invalid by a court and the child is born during the marriage or within
three hundred days after the termination of the marriage by death, annulment, divorce, or dissolution;
(b) The attempted marriage is invalid without a court order and the child is born within three hundred days
after the termination of cohabitation.
(3) The man and the child's mother, after the child's birth, married or attempted to marry each other by a
marriage solemnized in apparent compliance with the law of the state in which the marriage took place, and any
of the following occur:
(a) The man has acknowledged his paternity of the child in a writing sworn to before a notary public;
(b) The man, with his consent, is named as the child's father on the child's birth certificate;
(c) The man is required to support the child by a written voluntary promise or by a court order.
(4) The man, with his consent, signs the child's birth certificate as an informant as provided in Section
3705.14 of the Revised Code.
Id. § 3111.03.
12. Id. § 3111.04.
13. Id. § 3111.09(A).
14. Id. § 3111.09(E); see also Larson, Blood Test Exclusion Procedures in Paternity Litigation: The Uniform Acts
and Beyond, 13 J. FAM. L. 713 (1973-1974), discussing the variety of tests available and their use in paternity actions to
exclude men as the possible father of an infant.
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the court is required to dismiss the action.' 5 Expert testimony about the statistical
probability of parenthood based upon genetic testing is also admissible.16
The child is made a party to the parentage action, and if its interests are in-
consistent with those of the mother, the court is obligated to appoint separate counsel
to represent the child.1" Under the OPA neither a written agreement purporting to
establish paternity nor the marital status of the mother can bar an action to determine
parentage. 8 The OPA makes rebuttable the former strong presumption that a child
born during an ongoing marriage is the child of the husband. 9 Medical records
concerning the child's gestation and birth are admissible in a parentage action irre-
spective of the mother's doctor-patient privilege.
2 °
If a parentage action is brought on behalf of a child who is or was a recipient of
support from a government agency, that agency may intervene for the purposes of
collecting or recovering that support. 2' Furthermore, if the child is the legal ward of a
government agency, the agency may commence an action on behalf of the child.22
Thus, the state is provided with an important tool in the exercise of its legitimate
police power function of providing support for the minor child.
The OPA specifically acknowledges the nonbiological parent-child relationship
between an adoptive parent and child and makes reference to other provisions in the
Revised Code concerning adoption. 23 In instances of adoption the biological parents
are excused by court decree from the rights, privileges, and obligations of parent-
hood, and a new parent-child relationship is created between the child and the adop-
tive parents.24
II. ARTIFICIAL INSEMINATION BY DONOR
In the UPA another class of nonbiological parents is acknowledged. Section five
provides for the establishment of a legal parent-child relationship between a man who
consents to the artificial insemination of his wife with the semen of another man and
the child who results. This procedure, which is commonly referred to as artificial
insemination by donor or AID, has become increasingly common in recent years
because of increases in male infertility, increased awareness of genetically transmit-
ted diseases and disorders, and the decline in the number of healthy infants available
for adoption?25 The model legislation provides that,
15. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3111.09(D) (Page Supp. 1983).
16. Id. § 3111.10(C).
17. Id. § 3111.07(A).
18. Id. § 3111.04(B). Former § 3111.01 granted standing only to unmarried women. Act of Apr. 3, 1873, § 1, 1873
Ohio Laws I 11, 111 (codified as amended at OHIO REv. CODE ANN. (Page 1980) (repealed 1982)).
19. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3111.03(B) (Page Supp. 1983); Gray v. Richardson, 474 F.2d 1370, 1372 (6th Cir.
1973) (decided under pre-OPA law).
20. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3111.10(E) (Page Supp. 1983).
21. Id. § 3111.07(B).
22. Id. § 3111.04(A).
23. Id. § 3111.02 (referring to the provisions on adoption in Chapter 3107 of the Ohio Revised Code).
24. Id. § 3107.15.
25. Artificial insemination by donor was first practiced in the United States in 1884 by Addison Davis Hard.
R. SNOWDEN & G. MITCHELL, THE ARTIFICIAL FAMILY 13 (1981) [hereinafter cited as SNOWDEN & MITCHELL]. Its use
grew, and in 1941 it was estimated that 10,000 children per year were born in the United States as a result of AID.
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(a) [i]f, under the supervision of a licensed physician and with the consent of her
husband, a wife is inseminated artificially with semen donated by a man not her husband,
the husband is treated in law as if he were the natural father of a child thereby conceived.
The husband's consent must be in writing and signed by him and his wife. The physician
shall certify their signatures and the date of the insemination, and file the husband's
consent with the [State Department of Health], where it shall be kept confidential and in a
sealed file. However, the physician's failure to do so does not affect the father and child
relationship. All papers and records pertaining to the insemination, whether part of the
permanent record of a court or of a file held by the supervising physician or elsewhere, are
subject to inspection only upon an order of the court for good cause shown.
(b) The donor of semen provided to a licensed physician for use in artificial in-
semination of a married woman other than the donor's wife is treated in law as if he were
not the natural father of a child thereby conceived.
26
The OPA as introduced and enacted did not contain this language. 27 Thus, the
current statutory law of Ohio fails to make any specific provision for children con-
ceived by AID. The parentage of these children is subject to determination under the
general provisions of the OPA relative to biological parentage. The result of such a
determination is clearly in conflict with the intent of the participants in most artificial
insemination procedures, that is, that the child be reared as the offspring of the
consenting man and his wife, that the donor remain anonymous, and that the donor
not assume any of the rights, privileges, or obligations of parenthood.28
Section 3111.04(B) of the OPA provides that agreements between the parties
cannot bar a parentage action. As a result, the written consent forms used by many
AID practitioners to spell out the putative rights and responsibilities of the partici-
pants would not bar a subsequent parentage action possibly resulting in the exclusion
of the consenting husband from the family unit.29 In other jurisdictions such forms
have been found to estop a consenting husband and wife from later contesting the
parentage of a child conceived by AID.30
Verkauf, Artificial Insemination: Progress, Polemics, and Confusion-An Appraisal of Current Medico-Legal Status, 3
Hous. L. REV. 277, 279 (1966).
Current estimates of the number of AID births per year in the United States range from 5000 to 20,000. However, the
lack of recordkeeping and the secrecy surrounding the procedure make estimates questionable. Stone, Complications and
Pitfalls ofArtficial Insemination, 23 CLINICAL OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 667, 667 (1980); Comment, New Reproduc-
tive Technologies: The Legal Problem and a Solution, 49 TENN. L. REV. 303, 307 n. 18 (1982),
Many couples choose AID because of the absence of sperm or low sperm counts. Other couples choose it because the
husband has had a vasectomy, often during a previous marriage. The procedure is also used by couples with a known
genetically linked risk on the husband's part, such as Down's syndrome, hemophilia, Tay-Sachs, or cystic fibrosis. R.
AMELAR, L. DUBIN & P. WALSH, MALE INFERTIITY 238 (1977); SNOWDEN & MrrCHELL, supra, at 16, 115; Beck,
Artificial Insemination and Semen Preservation, in INFERTILrrY IN THE MALE 383-84 (1983); Curie-Cohen, Luttrell &
Shapiro, Current Practice of Artficial Insemination by Donor in the United States, 300 NEW ENG. J. MED. 585, 585
(1979) [hereinafter cited as Curie-Cohen].
The number of infants available for adoption has declined in recent years because of the increased acceptability of
single parent families and the use of birth control and abortion. R. AMELAR, L. DUBIN & P. WALSH, supra, at 240.
26. UNIF. PARENTAGE AcT § 5 (1979).
27. First Hearing on H.B. 147 Before the House Civil and Commercial Law Comm., 115th Ohio Gen. Assembly
(June 28, 1983) (statement of Rep. Marie Tansey).
28. See supra note 25.
29. See 15 AM. JIa. LEGAL FORMS 2D, Physicians and Surgeons § 202:85 (1973).
30. See, e.g., People v. Sorensen, 68 Cal. 2d 280, 288, 437 P.2d 495, 500-01, 66 Cal. Rptr. 7, 12-13 (1968);
Gursky v, Gursky, 39 Misc. 2d 1083, 1088, 242 N.Y.S.2d 406, 411-12 (Sup. Ct. 1963); Stmad v. Stmad, 190 Misc.
786, 787, 78 N.Y.S.2d 390, 392 (Sup. Ct. 1948).
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In the past, couples participating in AID also relied on their ability to keep the
AID secret. Because of the confidential medical setting and attempts to match the
donor's characteristics with those of the husband, they believed no one other than the
husband, the wife, and the doctor would ever know that the child conceived by AID
was not the husband's child. 3 ' Even if someone doubted the paternity, it could not be
disproved under prior law, which required proof of no sexual access by the husband
to overcome the presumption of spousal paternity.32 However, the development of
the genetic testing recognized by the OPA and its growing use in other medical
procedures, such as organ transplants, seriously increases the risk that the nonpater-
nity of the husband can be discovered and proved.
The genetic testing provisions of the OPA provide an easy means for excluding
the consenting husband from the legal status of father of the child. Because of the
sophistication and cost of such testing, genetic matching of a consenting husband
with an AID donor that would be sufficiently close to preclude this result is pragmati-
cally impossible. Because the scope and precision of such tests are becoming in-
creasingly sophisticated, even establishing a perfect match at the time of insemination
would not prevent exclusion of the consenting husband as a possible father on the
basis of the results of a subsequently discovered test in a future parentage action.
33
The OPA not only makes testing readily available, but also requires that a man
excluded by genetic testing be adjudged not to be the father. 34
Because in an OPA action the medical records and physician's testimony con-
cerning pregnancy and birth are available to the child and any alleged father, as well
as to the mother, the records concerning any AID procedure may not be privileged.
35
Thus, it might be possible for mothers of AID children or AID children themselves to
obtain the name of the donor-father and take legal action to obtain filial rights.
36
Therefore, current Ohio law creates substantial uncertainty for AID donors, AID
couples, and AID children. The issue of parentage could be raised in a number of
contexts, including child custody and support proceedings, the probate of estates, and
efforts on behalf of AID children to establish their biological heritage. 37 Because of
this confusion and possible parental liability for donors, several AID programs in
Ohio have ceased operation.
38
III. HOUSE BILL 147
House Bill 147, approved by the Ohio House of Representatives and currently
pending before the Ohio Senate Judiciary Committee, is very similar to section five
of the UPA. It provides for consenting AID husbands to be treated legally as the
31. Walington, Artificial Insemination: Tie Dangers of a Poorly Kept Secret, 64 Nw. U.L. REv. 777, 783 (1970);
AMERICAN FERTILITY Soc'Y, REPORT OF THE AD Hoc COMMITTrEE ON ARTIFICIAL INSEMINATION 5-6 (1980), cited in
Mcnning, Donor Insemination: The Psychosocial Issues, COTEMIP. OB/GYN, Oct. 1981, at 171.
32. Gray v. Richardson, 474 F.2d 1370 (6th Cir. 1973) (decided under pre-OPA law); OHIO REv. CODE ANN. §
3111.03(B) (Page 1980; current version in Page Supp. 1983).
33. Larson, supra note 14.
34. OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 3111.09(D) (Page Supp. 1983).
35. Id. § 3111.10(B).
36. Wadlington, supra note 31, at 792.
37. Id. at 785-93.
38. WBNS-TV News (Oct. 14, 1983-6:00 p.m. edition).
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natural father of a child conceived by AID, while excusing the donor from all parental
rights and liabilities.3 9 Upon proof that an AID has taken place with the consent of the
husband, an irrebuttable presumption arises that the husband is the father of the
child. 4' House Bill 147 conditions this transfer of parental obligations on medical
supervision of the procedure by a licensed physician or surgeon and execution of a
written consent signed by both husband and wife. 4 1 Although the bill provides for
certification by the physician of the written consents and their filing with the Depart-
ment of Health, the failure of certification and/or filing does not affect the validity of
the father-child relationship. 42 The confidentiality of the Department of Health rec-
ords as nonpublic records is assured: records pertaining to AID, including the records
of the supervising physician or surgeon, may not be inspected or copied without court
authorization, except by the physician, the husband, the wife, or the keeper of the
records .
It is probable that the provisions of House Bill 147 are also applicable to
donations of genetic material to women who cannot otherwise conceive. In the ovum
donation process the ovum of a donor is transferred to a donee who is unable to
ovulate and conceive so that the donee can bear a child. The ovum may be fertilized
either outside the donor's body by the in vitro process or before its removal44 from the
donor by the process of artificial insemination with the sperm of the intended father.
The embryo or ovum is then transferred to the donee's uterus. 45 Both these processes
fall with the provisions of House Bill 147 if the donation of the genetic material is
made with the consent of the intended parents and under the medical supervision of a
licensed physician. The OPA specifically makes its provisions relative to the es-
tablishment of paternity applicable to determinations of maternity.46 Thus, if a man
can become a legal father by joining his spouse in consenting to the donation of
genetic material, a woman should be able to become a legal mother in the same way.
Furthermore, the current statute recognizes the donee's legal status as mother of the
child on the basis that it is she who gives birth to the child.47
House Bill 147 is intended to create a means for determining the parentage of
AID children born to married women rather than to regulate AID itself. 48 The bill
does not attempt to regulate who may be an AID donor or an AID recipient couple. It
conditions the transfer of legal parentage from the donor to the recipient's husband on
neither a determination of the best interests of the child nor a determination of
parental fitness. However, some AID practitioners have objected to even the limited
39. H.B. 147, supra note 7, § 3111.031(A), (E).
40. Id. § 3111.03(B).
41. Id. § 3111.031(A).
42. Id. § 3111.031(B)-(C).
43. Id. § 3111.031(C).
44. Lorio, In Vitro Fertilization and Embryo Transfer: Fertile Areas for Litigation, 35 Sw. L.J. 973, 975-76
(1982). For a summary of available reproductive paradigms, see Comment, supra note 25, at 319-22.
45. Lorio, supra note 44, at 976.
46. Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 3111.17 (Page Supp. 1983). See Comment, supra note 25, at 320-21.
47. OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 3111.02 (Page Supp. 1983).
48. UNIF. PARENTAGE AcT § 5 comment (1979); Kritchevsky, The Unmarried Woman's Right to Artificial In-
senzination:A Call for an Expanded Definition of Family, 4 HARV. \VoaNir's L.J. I, 19 (1981); Lorio, supra note 44, at
991; Comment, supra note 25, at 316.
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recordkeeping provisions of this kind of legislation as an invasion of the privacy of
the AID couple and their physician. 49 Ironically, groups of adult adoptees, purporting
to speak for AID children, have objected to the bill's recordkeeping provision as too
confidential and limited and as a violation of the rights of the AID child to know his
or her biological heritage. 50 These objections point to the competing interests of the
different participants in the AID procedure.
A. The Privacy Rights of the AID Couple
Physicians' objections to House Bill 147 center around the requirement to file
with the State Health Department. These AID practitioners argue that the procedure is
a highly personal medical matter that should not be subject to government regulation.
This right to privacy argument has served as a basis for United States Supreme Court
decisions on reproductive freedom. 5 1 In Eisenstadt v. Baird52 the Court held that "if
the right of privacy means anything, it is the right of the individual ... to be free
from unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a
person as the decision whether to bear or beget a child." 53 In Doe v. Bolton, 51
another reproductive freedom case, physicians as amici complained that the abortion
regulations were an unwarranted intrusion into the physician-patient relationship.
Justice Douglas in his concurring opinion agreed: "The right of privacy has no more
conspicuous place than in the physician-patient relationship . . . . -5 Thus, medi-
cally supervised AID probably falls within the zone of privacy protected by the
federal constitution from governmental regulation unless a compelling state interest
in regulation of AID can be shown. 56 However, while the artificial insemination itself
occurs within the confines of the doctor-patient relationship, once the child is born, it
must live in the community. The child should be equally as entitled to the protection
and aid of the state in obtaining support and care as any other child. The determina-
tion of parentage and the provision of support for minors are legitimate state functions
in which the state has a compelling interest.5 7 The registration of consenting AID
49. Curie-Cohen, supra note 25, at 588 (indicating that 83% of AID practitioners oppose legislation requiring
rccordkeeping); Rubin, Year-Old Law Threatens to Bring Insemination into Light of Courtroom, Columbus Citizen-J.,
June 28, 1983, at 6, cols. 1-2.
50. Kritchevsky, supra note 48, at 23; Lorio, supra note 44, at 992; Rombeiro, Genealogy and Adoption, 14 OHIo
GNEALOntcAL Soom NEwsIL7iR 126-27 (1983); Second Hearing on H.B. 147 Before the House Civil and Com-
mercialLaw Comm., 115th Ohio Gen. Assembly (Oct. 20, 1983) (statement of Rep. Mark Malone); Comments of Paula
Burdett, President of Re-Unite, at A Child of My Heart Adoption Conference, Columbus, Ohio (Sept. 24, 1983).
51. Kritchevsky, supra note 48, at 26-31; Lorio, supra note 44, at 1006-10; Wingo & Freytag, Decisions Within the
Family: A Clash of Constitutional Rights, 67 IOwA L. REv. 401, 402-07 (1982); Comment, Artificial Human Reproduc-
tion: Legal Problems Presented by the Test Tube Baby, 28 EMORY L.J. 1045, 1057-61 (1979) [hereinafter cited as
Comment, Artificial Human Reproduction]; Comment, Pregnancy, Privacy, and the Constitution: The Court at the
Crossroads, 25 U. FLA. L. Ruv. 779 (1973).
52. 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
53. Id. at 453.
54. 410 U.S. 179 (1973).
55. Id. at 219 (Douglas, J., concurring).
56. Lorio, supra note 44, at 1006; Comment, Artificial Human Reproduction, supra note 51, at 1060; Note, The
Less Restrictive Alternative in Constitutional Adjudication: An Analysis, a Justification, and Some Criteria, 27 VAND. L.
REv. 971, 1029-36 (1974).
57. Poulin, Illegitimacy and Family Privacy: A Note on Maternal Cooperation in Paternity Suits, 70 Nw. U.L. REv.
910, 920-22 (1976).
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couples and their children is a reasonable means of establishing which children's
parentage should be subject to determination under the provisions of House Bill
147.58 Without such government records one spouse might be unable to prove that the
AID had occurred if the other spouse denied it and medical records were unavailable.
Further, the bill takes particular care to make registrations of AID conceptions as
private as possible. The required consents, as well as all other records and papers
pertaining to AID, are subject to inspection by persons other than the couple, the
doctor, and the recordkeeper only upon court authorization for good cause shown.
59
The copies of the written consents on file with the Department of Health are con-
fidential rather than public records. 60 Although the certification and filing provisions
of House Bill 147 are couched in mandatory terms, 61 there are no sanctions for
noncompliance: the child's parentage is not affected by the failure to certify or file the
consents nor are any specific penalties imposed on physicians who fail to certify.
62
B. The Right of the AID Child to Know Its Father
The interests of the AID child form the basis of another major objection raised to
House Bill 147. The bill grants access to all records involving AID only to the keeper
of the records, the doctor, and the AID couple. Others may obtain access only by
court order for good cause shown. 63 Because the only record required by the statute is
a written consent signed by the AID couple, 64 the provisions limiting access, it has
been suggested, deny the AID child information concerning his or her biological
heritage. That information might be sought by AID children, as it is by adult adop-
tees, in order to establish their own personal and psychological identities, to obtain
pertinent medical information, or to prevent incestuous marriages.
65
Proponents of the rights of children both adopted and AID-to know their
biological heritage rely on such constitutional grounds as a first amendment right to
freedom of communication, a ninth amendment right to privacy, and the fourteenth
amendment right to equal protection under the law.6 6 Despite recent litigation, the
existence of such rights remains undecided.67 Even if such rights do exist, the state
may promulgate reasonable regulations that impinge upon these rights if it has a
compelling state interest in doing so. 68 The participants in AID entered into the
58. See Curie-Cohen, supra note 25, at 588, indicating that only 36.9% of physicians keep records of AID births.
59. H.B. 147, supra note 7, § 3111.031(D).
60. Id. § 3111.031(C).
61. Section 3111.031(B) provides: "The physician or surgeon who supervised the artificial insemination shall
certify ... [and] shall file..." (emphasis added). Id. § 3111.031(B). Section 3111.031(C) provides: "The Department
of Health shall maintain a file . . ." (emphasis added). id. § 3111.031(C).
62. See id. § 3111.031(B)-(C).
63. Id. § 3111.031(D).
64. Id. § 3111.031(B)-(C).
65. Hanley, A Reasonable Approach to the Adoptee's Sealed Records Dilemma. 2 Oro N.U.L. REv. 542, 546
(1975); Wadlington, supra note 31, at 805; Note, The Adult Adoptee's Constitutional Right to Know His Origins. 48 S.
CAL. L. REV. 1196, 1204-10 (1975).
66. Hanley, supra note 65, at 546; Wadlington, supra note 31, at 805; Note, supra note 65. at 1204-10. See
generally Annot., 83 A.L.R.3o 800 (1978).
67. See Alma Soc'y Inc. v. Mellon, 459 F. Supp. 912 (S.D.N.Y. 1978); Mills v. Atlantic City Dep't of Vital
Statistics, 148 N.J. Super. 302, 372 A.2d 646 (Ch. Div. 1977); Kritchevsky, supra note 48, at 32; Note, Adoption, 16 J.
FAM. L. 615 (1978); Annot., 83 A.L.R.3D 800, 803 (1978).
68. Hanley, supra note 65. at 552; Note, supra note 67, at 617-20, Note. supra note 65, at 1210.
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procedure based upon the assurances of the physician that it would remain a private
matter and that their identity would be protected. The donor probably would have
refused to participate without this assurance. 69 Currently, only thirty percent of
American AID practitioners maintain any records of their donors, 70 and it is uncertain
how many of those records would indicate which donor was the father of a particular
AID child. Many physicians view this lack of records as a protective device for the
donor's privacy. 71 Thus, there is an expectation of privacy that the state must ac-
knowledge. 72 The closed records provision of House Bill 147 may be appropriate in
order to protect the privacy of the biological parents and the person assuming the care
of the child, as are similar provisions in the context of adoption.73
House Bill 147's provision that the records may be inspected upon court au-
thorization for good cause shown may provide some AID children access to the
written consents, just as similar provisions have given adopted children access to the
court records of their adoptions. 74 It is less certain that the court would order or that a
physician would permit disclosure of information in the physician's files. The bill
does not clearly indicate an intention to remove or mitigate any privilege that cur-
rently exists concerning these records.75 Thus, this issue remains for future resolu-
tion.
IV. MATTERS FOR FURTHER LEGISLATIVE AcTION
The enactment of House Bill 147 will clarify the status of AID children, donors,
and couples in Ohio, and it will sanction the agreement between the AID participants
concerning the parentage of the child. However, other issues remain for further
legislative consideration. These include the possible regulation of AID participants
and the use of AID to impregnate surrogate mothers and single women.
A. Regulation of AID
House Bill 147 does not attempt to regulate who may offer AID services to the
public, who may be an AID donor, or who may be a AID recipient. 76 Artificial
insemination procedures require no elaborate medical equipment nor specialized
training. It is possible for a lay person or the woman herself to perform AID.77 The
state has police power authority to promulgate regulations to protect the health of
society. 78 Restricting the practice of AID does reasonably relate to the state's interest
69. Annas, Fathers Anonymous: Beyond the Best Interests of the Sperm Donor, 14 FAm. L.Q. 1, 10 (1980).
70. Curie-Cohen, supra note 25, at 588.
71. Annas, supra note 69, at 10; Curie-Cohen, supra note 25, at 589.
72. Annas, supra note 69, at 10; Wadlington, supra note 31, at 803.
73. Alma Soc'y Inc. v. Mellon, 459 F. Supp. 912, 916 (S.D.N.Y. 1978); Mills v. Atlantic City Dep't of Vital
Statistics, 148 N.J. Super. 302, 311, 372 A.2d 646, 651 (Ch. Div. 1977). Cf. Note, supra note 65, at 1214.
74. See 83 A.L.R.3D 800, 808-809 (1978) (citing In re Ann Carol "S.," 172 N.Y.L.J. 12 (Aug. 13, 1974)).
75. Onto REv. CODE ANN. §§ 2317.02 (Page 1981); 4731.22 (Page Supp. 1983). See generally 10 A.L.R.4TH 552
(1981).
76. See, e.g., OR. REv. STAT. § 677.370 (1979); N.Y.C. DEP'T OF HEALTH, HEALTH CODE § 21.01-07 (1973).
77. C.M. v. C.C., 152 N.J. Super. 160, 377 A.2d 821 (Juv. & Dom. Rel. Ct. 1979).
78. Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 545 (1942) (Stone, J., concurring); Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 207
(1927); Kindregan, State Power over Human Fertiliy and Individual Liberty, 23 HASTINGS L.J. 1401. 1411-1414 (1972);
Comment, Artificial Human Reproduction, supra note 51, at 1054-56.
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in protecting the AID recipient from the health risks accompanying the procedure and
the state's interest in maintaining accurate and confidential records for purposes of
determining parentage.7 9 However, specific legislation restricting the practice of AID
may be redundant, as the prohibitions against the unlicensed practice of medicine
currently in effect in most states may already preclude lay administration of AID for
compensation. 8° It is less certain that laws against unlicensed practice of medicine
prohibit self-administered AID or the noncommercial assistance of a woman in per-
forming self-administered AID. However, because AID that is not medically super-
vised fails legally to terminate the donor's parental status and lacks the protective
confidentiality of the medical setting, it is clearly less desirable to participants. Thus,
unsupervised AID presents little danger to the community.
Although some jurisdictions have chosen to provide statutory guidelines for
donor selection by requiring freedom from genetic and venereal disease, 8 1 merely
confining AID to the medical context will ensure medical supervision of donor
selection. There are no universally accepted professional protocols for donor
selection, 82 but studies show that donors tend to be younger, healthier, and more
intelligent than the general population, and that the offspring of AID are not at
significantly greater risk of genetic defects than the general population. 83 Thus, the
need for specific governmental regulation of donors to prevent genetically defective
children and venereal disease has not been demonstrated.
Currently, couples seeking to utilize medically supervised artificial insemination
are subject only to the physician's screening and not any governmental screening. 84
However, a recent proposal would modify the UPA to require performance of genetic
and psychological testing to assure that the procedure is in the best interest of the
child, that the test results and the parties' written consents to a court are certified, and
that parental fitness is adjudicated prior to the performance of AID. 85 Such licensure
79. For a discussion of the health risks involved in AID, notably pelvic inflammatory disease, herpes, infertility
linked to T mycoplasma, and chlamydia, gonorrhea, and hepatitis, see Stone, supra note 25, at 669.
For a discussion of the state's interest in parentage identification, see supra note 57 and accompanying text.
80. Ohio law forbids unlicensed persons to practice medicine or surgery. OnIo REV. CODE ANN. § 4731.41 (Page
1977). The practice of medicine, surgery, podiatry, or midwifery is broadly defined to include any person who
examines or diagnoses for compensation of any kind, or prescribes, advises, recommends, administers, or
dispenses for compensation of any kind, direct or indirect, a drug or medicine, appliance, mold or cast,
application, operation, or treatment, of whatever nature, for the cure or relief of a wound, fracture or bodily
injury, infirmity, or disease.
Id. § 4731.34.
A person who uses a syringe to place a donor's semen within the vagina to overcome impairment of infertility in
exchange for compensation probably is required to be a licensed professional. Artificial insemination is traditionally
viewed as a form of medical therapy. Kritchevsky, supra note 48, at 2; Note, Therapeutic Impregnation: Prognosis of a
Lawyer-Diagnosis of a Legislature, 39 U. CIN. L. REv. 291 (1970).
81. New York City, for example, requires a physical examination of all donors, including screening for venereal
disease. N.Y.C. DEP'T OF HEALTH, HEALTH CODE § 21.01-07 (1973). Oregon requires that a physician select the donor
and that the donor be screened for venereal disease and genetically transmitted diseases. OR. REv. STAT. § 677.370
(1983).
82. Curie-Cohen, supra note 25, at 588; Fraser & Forse, On Genetic Screening of Donors for Artificial Insemina-
tion, 10 AM. J. MED. GENETIcs 399, 401-02 (1981).
83. Curie-Cohen, supra note 25, at 588; Fraser & Forse, supra note 82, at 400-01; Lorio, supra note 44, at 989;
Stone, supra note 79, at 674.
84. SNOWDEN & MITCHELL, supra note 25, at 54-55; Annas, supra note 69, at 5-6.
85. Comment, supra note 25, at 338-41.
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raises serious constitutional concerns. The mere existence of such a screening mech-
anism would have a chilling effect on the practice of AID. Couples undergoing AID
are often very concerned about confidentiality and may in fact choose AID over
adoption because of greater privacy. 86 If governmental licensure of AID is required,
couples may be deterred from utilizing the procedure.
The practice of AID is probably within the zone of privacy protected by the
Constitution. 87 Regulation concerning AID can withstand constitutional challenge
only if the state has a compelling interest and if the regulation is reasonably related to
that interest, that is, neither overbroad nor underinclusive. 88 The screening of AID
recipients to insure parental fitness will be found underinclusive unless it can be
demonstrated that children conceived by AID are more likely to be abused or neg-
lected than children conceived by sexual intercourse. No such evidence is available.
Further, screening of all prospective AID recipient couples and violating their privacy
to prevent abuse by a small percentage of them is overly broad. In regulating fun-
damental rights, such as the right to bear a child, the state must utilize the least
restrictive method possible to protect the compelling state interest. 89 The state can
protect abused and neglected children more selectively without impinging on the
rights of nonabusive prospective parents by removing children identified as abused or
neglected from their parents' home. 90
Any governmental regulation that would limit the constitutional rights of the
prospective parents for the benefit of an unconceived and unborn child is con-
stitutionally suspect. The state, although empowered as the parens patriae to protect
minors, is limited in its exercise of this power on behalf of unborn, nonviable
humans. 9' Thus, such regulation for the protection of unconceived children is prob-
ably unconstitutional.
B. Parentage, Artificial Insemination, and the Surrogate
Recently, surrogate mothering services have been established around the coun-
try; they match couples who are infertile due to a female infertility problem with
women who agree to be artificially inseminated with the husband's sperm, bear a
child, and surrender the child to the man and his wife to be raised by them. 92 The
surrogate generally is compensated for her services. 93 The legal ramifications, both
civil and criminal, are myriad,94 but the determination of the child's legal parentage
is the crux of the matter. Under the OPA it is clear that the written agreement
86. SNowoE & MITCHELL, supra note 25, at 55-56; Kritchevsky, supra note 48, at 2 n.5.
87. See supra notes 51-56 and accompanying text.
88. See supra note 56 and accompanying text.
89. Lorio, supra note 44, at 1006; Note, supra note 56, at 1029-36.
90. See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.353 (Page Supp. 1983).
91. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 159-64 (1973).
92. See Bloom, Local Woman to Start Surrogate Parenting Service, Columbus Dispatch, Aug. 8, 1982, at 1, col. 2.
93. Id. at I. col. 3.
94. See Eisenman, Surrogating Mothering-An Option for Infertile Couples?, COLUMBUS B.A. B. BRIEFS,, Jan. 30,
1983. at 4; Keane, Legal Problems of Surrogate Motherhood, 1980 S. ILL. U. L.J. 147; Comment, Contracts to Bear a
Child, 66 CALIF. L. REV. 611 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Comment, Contracts]; Comment, Artificial Insemination and
Surrogate Motherhood-A Nursety Full of Unresolved Questions, 17 WILLAMErrE L.J. 913, 920-24 (1981) [hereinafter
cited as Comment, Artificial Insemination].
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concerning the child's parentage between the biological father and the surrogate is not
enforceable. 95 Proponents of surrogate mothering characterize the child as the legal
child of the biological father and characterize the biological father's wife as the
child's stepmother.96 This characterization allows the biological father to seek cus-
tody of the child from the surrogate, if she w ere to decline to place the child with him.
However, in that event, the child could not be removed from her custody by the
biological father until a parentage action had established parentage and a custody
action had been brought. 97 The burden of proof is on the contracting father to
establish that the mother is an unsuitable custodian or, at the very least, that the father
is a more appropriate custodian. 98 After obtaining placement, the contracting father's
custody would still be subject to visitation by the surrogate. 99 No adoption would be
possible without the surrogate's consent, a permanent commitment proceeding, or a
finding of abandonment. I1°
Even with the consent of the parties, the issue of adoptability of the child must
be decided by the probate court on a case by case basis. The court has considerable
discretion in the matter of adoption, but the petition must be denied if the placement
was made in violation of the law. 1o1 The law prohibits any payments in conjunction
with a private adoption other than for foster care, medical expenses, and attorney's
fees.'0 2 Proponents of surrogate mothering have suggested that payments to the
surrogate will be permissible under the statutory exception for stepparent adop-
tions.1 °3 The court could require a parentage action and genetic testing under the
OPA in order to establish that the proceeding is in fact a stepparent adoption. In the
alternative, the court might agree with a recent Attorney General's opinion that the
relationship of the contracting father's wife and the surrogate's child is not within the
definition of stepparent as envisioned by the legislature in Section 5103.16 of the
Revised Code. 10 4
House Bill 147 would further complicate the transaction by making the child of a
married surrogate the legal offspring of her husband and the biological father a legal
stranger to the child.' 5 Thus, the transfer of physical and legal custody of the child
becomes a private placement and adoption. An adoption of this kind requires the
voluntary surrender of the child by the surrogate and her husband. If they choose not
to surrender the child, the biological father, as a legal stranger, would be without
recourse. The child could not be placed with the biological father for adoption
95. OHo REv. CODE ANN. §§ 3111.04(B) (Page Supp. 1983), 5103.16 (Page 1981).
96. 1983 Ohio Att'y Gen. Op. 2-1.
97. OHIo REv. CODE ANN. ch. 3111, § 2151.23(A)(2) (Page Supp. 1983). A parentage action might be required in
order to determine that the child was not the offspring of the surrogate's husband.
98. See, e.g., In re Byrd, 66 Ohio St. 2d 334, 421 N.E.2d 1284 (1981); Pruitt v. Jones, 62 Ohio St. 2d 237, 405
N.E.2d 276 (1980) (parent must show that awarding him or her the child is in the child's best interest).
99. In re Byrd, 66 Ohio St. 2d 334, 339 n.6, 421 N.E.2d 1284, 1287 n.6 (1981).
100. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2151.353, 3107.06-07 (Page Supp. 1983), 5103.15 (Page 1981).
101. Id. § 3107.14(D) (Page 1980).
102. Id. § 5103.16 (Page 1981).
103. Id. § 5103.16(C).
104. 1983 Ohio Att'y Gen. Op. 2-1.
105. H.B. 147, supra note 7, § 3111.031(A).
[Vol. 45:383
ARTIFICIAL INSEMINATION BY DONOR
without the prior approval of the court."o6 The payments to the surrogate would
clearly be illegal and would bar the approval of such a transaction by the court. Thus,
the use of a married surrogate would not be feasible.
Several groups are currently studying the problems posed by the surrogate
mother transaction.10 7 Although the proponents of surrogate mothering wish to liken
it to AID, 10 8 it is distinctly different in that the surrogate both provides the genetic
material for the child and gestates the resulting embryo until an independent human
being is born. The transfer of genetic material, which is personal property,10 9 can
occur in an AID procedure within a doctor's office, and no one beyond that office
need ever be aware of it. The existence of a child, an independent human being, and
the necessity of transferring its physical custody remove the surrogate transaction
from the confines and privacy of the doctor's office,110 with a resultant diminution in
the privacy interest to be protected. Further, the existence of an independent human
being justifies state intervention in the surrogate transaction no less than it does in
third trimester abortions, when a potentially independent human being exists."'
The interests of the contracting couple would be best safeguarded by regarding
the couple as the legal parents of the child from the time of conception. " 2 Perhaps
some form of preconception approval and quasi adoption proceeding would be appro-
priate, such as the proposal discussed earlier in connection with AID. 13 This pro-
posal would modify the UPA to provide for licensing of all surrogate mother in-
termediaries and would require performance of genetic and psychological testing on
contract participants, certifications of the tests and the contract to the courts, and a
court adjudication of parental fitness and the best interests of the child prior to any
attempt at conception. The completion of the quasi adoption, however, could not
occur until after birth and placement. If a substantial change in circumstances oc-
curred, the continuing jurisdiction of the court would permit further review of the
proposed placement. Thus, if the surrogate changed her mind or if the court dis-
covered previously unknown, unfavorable facts about the contracting couple, the
prior approval might be withdrawn.
Prebirth adoptive parent status is somewhat difficult to envision and would be
difficult to administer because the child has no independent viable life but is instead
completely dependent for its being on the surrogate. Although the surrogate agree-
ment may contain provisions covering prenatal care, nutritional guidelines for the
surrogate, and elective abortion, the couple probably could not obtain injunctive
relief or specific performance if the surrogate failed to comply with these terms.114
106. Onto REV. CODE ANN. § 5103.16 (Page 1981).
107. Richard B. Metcalf, Probate Court Judge, Franklin County, Ohio, has convened an interdisciplinary group to
study these issues. Likewise, the Ohio State University Commission on Inter-Professional Education and Practice is
considering them.
108. Keane, supra note 94, at 155-56.
109. See Comment, supra note 25, at 323-28.
110. See Comment, Parenthood by Proxy: Legal Implications of Surrogate Birth, 67 IowA L. REv. 385, 394
(1982).
Ill. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 161 (1973).
112. Comment, supra note 25, at 341-42.
113. See supra note 85 and accompanying text.
114. Eisenman, supra note 94, at 5; Comment, Contracts, supra note 94, at 620.
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The contracting couple would be in a situation similar to that of the father of an
unborn child, that is, without legal recourse to protect the child from its gestational
mother. 115
In the alternative, the state might choose specifically to outlaw commercial
surrogate transactions and refuse to allow the adoption mechanism to be utilized to
clarify the parentage of a commercial surrogate's children.1 16 Specific revision of
"anti-baby-selling" statutes to include commercial surrogate transactions would be
sufficient in this regard.
C. AID and the Single Woman
This Article has discussed the use of AID procedures by married couples as a
means of overcoming a fertility problem. However, AID is also being utilized by
single women who desire to become the sole legal parent of a child.' House Bill
147 makes no provision for determining the legal parentage of an AID child born to a
single woman. 118 It has been suggested that no specific provision is necessary be-
cause in medically supervised inseminations the donor's anonymity protects him
from liability and prevents him from asserting parental rights. As a result, there is no
social father wishing to establish legal parentage." 9 Thus, single women utilizing
AID are already de facto single parents even in the absence of specific legislation.
This analysis presumes that the medical procedures and records either prevent the
identification of the donor or that they are protected by physician-patient privilege.
Medical records concerning AID donors generally are not kept, and when they are
maintained, they often do not indicate which donor is responsible for a particular
conception. 120 The status of physician-patient privilege is less certain. The OPA
provides that medical records concerning gestation and birth are admissible in paren-
tage actions without regard to the privilege.121
If the identity of the donor does become known or if the donor becomes aware of
the child's identity, a legal parent-child relationship could be established by either the
donor or the child. 122 The only reported case dealing with a single AID mother
allowed the biological father the parental rights he sought, in spite of the mother's
objections, on the premise that having two parents whenever possible is in a child's
best interest. 123 Under the general provisions of the OPA, as under the previous law,
115. See generally Comment, Abortion and the Husband's Consent, 13 J. FAi. L. 311 (1973-1974); Note,
Abortion: The Father's Rights, 42 U. CN. L. REv. 441 (1973).
116. 1983 Ohio Att'y Gen. Op. 2-1.
117. Annas, supra note 69, at 5; Curie-Cohen, supra note 25, at 585; Kritchevsky, supra note 48, at 3 n.10; Note,
The Fourteenth Amendment's Protection of a Woman's Right to Be a Single Parent Through Artificial Insemination by
Donor, 7 WOMEN'S RTS. L. REP. 251, 252 n.5 (1982).
118. House Bill 147 applies only to married women, their husbands, and donors to married women. H.B. 147, supra
note 7, § 3111.031(A).
119. Note, supra note 117.
120. See supra note 71 and accompanying text.
121. See supra notes 74-75 and accompanying text.
122. C.M. v. C.C., 152 N.J. Super. 160, 377 A.2d 821 (Juv. & Doam. Rel. Ct. 1977); Osno REv. CODE ANN. §
3111.04 (Page Supp. 1983); Kritchevsky, supra note 48, at 15-16 & n.71.
123. C.M. v. C.C., 152 N.J. Super. 160, 167, 377 A.2d 821, 824 (Juv. & Dom. Rel. Ct. 1977).
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if a single woman becomes pregnant, whether the pregnancy is the result of AID or
intercourse, the biological father has parental rights and responsibilities. 124 Because
of possible legal liability for the donor and because of prejudices against single
motherhood, single women have often had difficulty obtaining AID services.'
2 5
Five states have provisions dealing with the artificial insemination of single
women. 126 In four of these states the legislatures have dealt with the issue by excus-
ing donors in medically supervised artificial insemination procedures from parental
liability, regardless of the marital status of the recipient. 127 Such provisions would
remove some of the current confusion concerning the legality of artificial insemina-
tion for single women and would be consistent with the Supreme Court's contracep-
tion and abortion cases, which have stressed the individual's right to reproductive
freedom. 1
28
Some jurisdictions may be unwilling tacitly to sanction the creation of one
parent families by AID. It is often stated that single parent families are at greater
financial and emotional risk and that two parent family units are the preferred family
unit for child rearing.1 29 The UPA affirms this preference by affirming the right of all
children to a legal relationship with, and support from, both parents, regardless of the
parent's marital status or wishes. '30 Similar emphasis on the child's right to a parental
relationship with both parents is seen in divorce cases in which the court has refused
to allow the parents inter sese to limit or sever the support obligations or visitation
rights of one parent to the detriment of the child.' 31 In some other cases courts have
denied single parent adoptions. 132
V. CONCLUSION
The enactment of House Bill 147 would clarify the status of AID families and
donors in Ohio. It would change the legal paternity of a child born as a result of a
medically supervised AID procedure from the biological father to the consenting
husband based upon the written consents of the participants. This sanction would
constitute a major departure from the general provisions of the OPA, which refuses to
honor private agreements and which bases all final determinations of paternity on a
124. Onto REV. CODE ANN. § 3111.02 (Page Supp. 1983).
125. Curie-Cohen, supra note 25, at 585; Kritchevsky, supra note 48, at 16; Note, supra note 117.
126. Kritchevsky, supra note 48, at 18 (the four states whose statutes are cited infra note 127 plus Oregon, OR. REV.
STAT. § 677.355-.370 (1983)).
127. See CAL. ctv. CODE ANN. § 7005(b) (West 1983); CoLO. REV. STAT. § 19-6-106(2) (1978); WASH. REV.
CODE ANN. § 26.26.050(2) (Supp. 1983-1984); Wyo. STAT. § 14-2-103(b) (1978).
128. Kritchevsky, supra note 48, at 26-40; Note, supra note 117, at 260-62. See supra text accompanying notes
51-55.
129. Poulin, supra note 57, at 919-20.
130. Cf. Oto REV. CODE ANN. § 3111.02 (Page Supp. 1983) (parent-child relationship may be established with
natural mother, natural father, or adoptive parent); see also Wallach & Tenoso, supra note 9.
131. E.g., Dep't of Mental Health & Mental Retardation v. Wiedemann, 1 Ohio App. 3d 27, 437 N.E.2d 1212
(1980); Miller v. Miller, 7 Ohio App. 2d 22, 218 N.E.2d 630 (1966); Campbell v. Campbell, 46 Ohio App. 197, 188
N.E. 300 (1933); Annot., 57 A.L.R.2D 1139 (1958).
132. E.g., Adoption of Infant H., 69 Misc. 2d 304, 330 N.Y.S.2d 235 (Fam. Ct. 1975); Van Kleek v. State Pub.
Welfare Comm'n (In re Adoption of Schultz), 252 Or. 497, 450 P.2d 549 (1969); Annot., 2 A.L.R.4TH 555 (1980);
contra In re Adoption of Corey, 182 N.E.2d 75 (Ohio P. Ct. 1959). See Onto REV. CODE ANN. § 3107.03 (Page 1980).
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court order. Furthermore, unlike the provisions of the OPA relative to biological
paternity and adoption, the proposed legislation does not accord the AID child in-
dependent representation, either through a court appointed next friend or an attorney,
in the determination of legal parentage.
This departure in philosophy must not be read as a sanction of all attempts to
change the legal parentage of a child born as a result of medically assisted conception
or gestation. The provisions of House Bill 147 are based upon the privacy interests
that are inherent in the physician-patient and the marital relationships. Although the
General Assembly may at some future time choose to extend such sanction to agree-
ments involving surrogate mothering and artificial insemination of single women,
House Bill 147 does not do so. In such future considerations on these matters the
General Assembly may find a sufficiently compelling interest in the AID child's
welfare to justify state review or licensing of these procedures in order to shift legal
parentage.
